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Introduction
Project risk management (PRM) is crucial to the success of projects. Unexpected conditions or planning errors may lead to delays, over-costs and other failures which can undermine the successful realization of the project. We refer to such potential events which may affect positively or negatively project activities and project results as project risks. Risk analysis is an indispensable activity for project management, even more for complex projects dealing with large stakes and involving interdependent tasks and organizations (Eckert et al. 2004, Kloss-Grote and Moss 2008) . In classical PRM, risk analysis is used for evaluating and prioritizing risks, essentially with respect to -3 -their probability and impact (Chapman and Ward 2003, PMI 2008) . The outputs of the analysis support decision-making, e.g., in terms of planning response actions and allocating resources.
Projects are facing a growing complexity, in both their structure and context. In addition to the organizational and technical complexities described by Baccarini (Baccarini 1996) , project managers have to consider a growing number of parameters (e.g., environmental, social, safety, and security) and a growing number of stakeholders, both inside and outside the project. The existence of numerous and diverse elements which are strongly interrelated is one of the main characteristics of complexity (Corbett et al. 2002 , Chu et al. 2003 , Jones and Anderson 2005 . The complexity of project leads to the existence of a network of interdependent risks (Fang and Marle 2012) , where complex phenomena may occur, hard to anticipate and hard to keep under control. For instance, there might be propagation from one -upstream‖ risk to numerous -downstream‖ risks; on the other side, a -downstream‖ risk may arise from the occurrence of several -upstream‖ risks which may belong to different categories.
The extreme case of this propagation behaviour is the chain reaction phenomenon or the -domino effect‖. Another phenomenon is the loop, namely a causal path that leads from the initial occurrence of an event to the triggering of subsequent consequences until the initial event occurs once more. An example of loop is that one initial risk, project schedule delay, may have an impact on a cost overrun risk, which will influence a technical risk, and then propagate to and amplify the original risk of schedule delay.
Many risk management methods and associated tools have now been developed.
They are usually based on two concepts: probability and impact, assessed by qualitative or quantitative approaches. Many of these methods independently evaluate the -4 -characteristics of risks, and focus on the analysis of individual risks. Risks are usually listed and ranked by one or more parameters (Williams 1995 , Baccarini and Archer 2001 , Raz and Michael 2001 . Generally, these methods do not take into account the subsequent influence of risks and cannot represent the interrelation between them. We can also cite the creativity-based or the expertise-based techniques, like expert judgement using Delphi, affinity diagram, peer interviews or risk diagnosis methodology (RDM) (Kawakita 1991 , Kerzner 1998 , Keizer et al. 2002 .
To comprehensively understand a risk, it is helpful to identify its causes as well as its effects. Several methods include this principle, but they still concentrate on a single risk for simplifying the problem (Carr and Tah 2001, Heal and Kunreuther 2007) .
For instance, failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) consists in a qualitative analysis of dysfunction modes followed by a quantitative analysis of their effects, in terms of probability and impact (Stamatis 2003) ; fault tree and cause tree analyses determine the conditions which lead to an event and use logical connector combinations (Pahl et al. 2007 , Ferdous et al. 2011 . These methods are unable to model complex interactions among different risks. Few specific methods are able to model risk correlations with a network structure. Several papers on the application of the Bayesian belief network (BBN) have appeared in recent years in the field of project risk management (Fan and Yu 2004 , Lee et al. 2008 , Trucco et al. 2008 ), which could model risk interrelations, from multiple inputs to multiple outputs. Nevertheless, BBN demands oriented links, is inherently acyclic, and hence does not easily model the loop phenomenon. These methods are thus not always applicable for practical purpose and fail in some cases to represent the real complexity of the interdependencies among risks.
-5 -In the last decade, a number of studies have focused on the modelling of complex systems such as critical infrastructures from the standpoint of network theory, to understand how the network underlying the system influences its behaviour, and eventually its characteristics of stability and robustness to faults and attacks (Zio 2007) .
Some network centrality measures have been applied, for the first time, to large-scale engineering design and product development networks by Braha and Bar-Yam in (Braha and Bar-Yam 2004b , Braha and Bar-Yam 2004a , Braha et al. 2006 , Braha and Bar-Yam 2007 . These works have provided two interesting results. First, they have shown by analysing large scale product design and development networks that many of these measures are highly correlated. Second, they have shown that the robustness and stability of complex engineering systems is closely linked with the existence of hubs, and that the network behaviour is sensitive to its structure. In addition, eigenstructure or eigenvector analysis has been used for identifying key features in the engineering design iterations in (Smith and Eppinger 1997) and for exploring some hiding information in the complex product development projects in (Yassine et al. 2003) .
Since all these measures have been proven to be relevant for the analysis of complex networks, some of them are tailored and applied in this work, for the first time, in the area of project risk management. With a view to exploring the interrelationships among project risks, a matrix-based approach for building the project risk network and analysing risk propagation behaviour is proposed. Classical project risks lists are used as the inputs of the network model. They usually only take into account the negative aspects of risks. Existing methods like the Design Structure Matrix (DSM) for dependency modelling are employed to identify and evaluate risk interactions. An eigenstructure analysis is used with the goal of measuring the importance of risks in the -6 -network. A risk propagation model is introduced to calculate risk propagation and thus to re-evaluate risk probability and criticality taking into account risk interactions. The aim is to provide project managers with an improved quantitative risk analysis method and thus to support them in making more reliable risk response planning decisions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the process of building the project risk network. Section 3 performs an eigenstructure analysis based on the risk network for measuring risk importance in terms of influence in the network. Section 4 presents a matrix-based risk propagation model for re-evaluating risk characteristics and updating risk prioritisation. An example of an application to a real project in the construction industry is presented in Section 5 to illustrate the proposed method. We conclude the paper in Section 6 with a discussion of the proposed approach and perspectives.
Modelling of project risk network
There are a number of classical methods for identifying individual project risks based on analogy (Riek 2001, Smith and Merritt 2002) , on heuristics (Kerzner 1998 , Chapman 2001 or analytically (Shimizu and Noguchi 2005 
Identification of risk network
Identification is the first step of determining the dependency relationship between the identified risks. The design structure matrix (DSM) method introduced by Steward -8 - (Steward 1981 ) has proven to be a practical tool for representing and analyzing relations and dependencies among system components (Browning 2001, Danilovic and Browning 2007 (Lindemann et al. 2008) . Third, there may be relationships between risks related to the same object, like for instance risk of delay and risk of overcost for a task.
Whatever the nature (or type) of dependency between two objects (homogeneous or heterogeneous) or two attributes of the same object, it is transformed into a single interaction between two risks. These risks may be related to the same object or not, and may be of the same nature or not. Risk interaction is thus considered as the existence of a possible precedence relationship between two risks. We define the -9 -Risk Structure Matrix (RSM), which is a binary and square matrix with RSM ij = 1 when there is a link from R j to R i . It does not address concerns about the probability or impact assessment of this interaction. We put a sanity check between R i and R j . Suppose we know that the actor who owns R i declared R j as a cause. If the actor who owns R j did not declare R i as a consequence, then there is a mismatch. This means that the two actors are not always mutually aware of their interaction, and this is the case in reality.
Each mismatch is studied and solved by asking simultaneously to both actors if there is or not a potential dependency relationship between the two risks they own respectively, like the analogous works by Sosa and co-workers about the interactions between project actors (Sosa et al. 2004) . 
Assessment of risk network
In the assessment step, we not only evaluate risk characteristics such as risk probability and risk impact, but also assess the strength of risk interactions, which is interpreted as -10 -transition probability between risks.
Risk impact may be assessed on a qualitative scale (ordinal or cardinal scale with 5 or 10 levels for instance) or on a quantitative scale (financial loss for instance).
Risk impact is assessed by classical methods, based upon a mix of previous experience and expert judgement.
For the probability assessment, we make a distinction between the probability of a risk to be triggered by another risk inside the network and its probability caused by external events or risks which are outside the system. Spontaneous probability can be interpreted as the evaluated likelihood of a risk, which is not the effect from other activated risks inside the system. On the other hand, transition probability is the evaluation of direct cause-effect relation between two risks. For the example in Figure   1 , Risk 5 occurs only in accordance with its spontaneous probability; and Risk 6 may arise from both its spontaneous probability and the transition probability between Risk 5 and Risk 6.
Qualitative scales are often used to express probability with 5 to 10 levels (e.g., very rare, rare, unlikely, etc.) which correspond to non-linear probability measures (e.g.,
10
-4 , 10 -3 , 10 -2 , etc.). Logarithmic scales have been used by statisticians for decades (Fleiss 1981) . They allow to distribute probabilities unevenly. In practice, they devote more space to small values, imposing a compressed, logarithmic mapping. Based on this principle, we can use, for example, the following equation for converting qualitative scales into quantitative measures of risk probability:
where p indicates the quantitative probability measure, q indicates the qualitative scale -11 -value, with parameters 0, 0   which are set by experience and are case-dependent.
A numerical structure matrix can provide more detailed information than a binary one about the risk network for assisting decision-making. Thus the RSM can be converted into the Risk Numerical Matrix (RNM) through assessing the risk interaction.
RNM ij is defined as the strength value of the cause-effect interaction from R j to R i . With regard to the project risk network, values in the RNM can also be interpreted as the transition probability between risks. For example, if the element RNM(4,3) is equal to 0.25, then the probability of Risk 4 originating from Risk 3 is considered to be 25%
under the condition that risk 3 is activated.
Eigenstructure analysis
In mathematics, eigenvalues and eigenvectors are related concepts in the field of linear algebra, which describe characteristics of a matrix. Analysing these eigenstructure properties gives important information about the adjacency matrix and its related network. The mathematical expression of eigenstructure decomposition is as follows: if M is a square matrix, a non-zero vector v is an eigenvector of M if and only if there is a scalar λ such that
The scalar λ is said to be the eigenvalue of M corresponding to v.
Bonacich suggested that the eigenvector of the largest eigenvalue of an adjacency matrix could make a good network centrality measure (Bonacich 1972) . For example, the variant of the eigenvector centrality measure is used in Google's PageRank ® algorithm (Page et al. 1999) . Another closely correlated centrality measure -12 -is the Katz centrality measure (Katz 1953 
For the i-th node, let its score x i be proportional to the sum of the scores of all the nodes which are directly connected to it. Here we take into account both the input and output links, i.e., both the immediate predecessor and successor risks of Risk i in the network. Thus, we get the following equation:
where IN(i) is the set of nodes that are direct predecessors of the i-th node and OUT(i)
is the set of nodes that are direct successors of the i-th node. In this way, the importance score of R i is equal to the average importance score of all its neighbour risks. Then we can reformulate the Eq. (4) as:
where A T is the transpose matrix of A, and then as the eigenvalue equation:
-13 -In general, there will be many different eigenvalues λ for which an eigenvector solution exists. However, in linear algebra, the Perron-Frobenius theorem, proved by Perron and Frobenius (Perron 1907) , (Frobenius et al. 1912) , asserts that a real square matrix with positive entries has a unique largest real eigenvalue and that the corresponding eigenvector has strictly positive components, and also asserts a similar statement for certain classes of nonnegative matrices. Usually, the Perron-Frobenius theorem applies to our case of risk network and the matrix A+A T .
We define the i-th element x i of the eigenvector corresponding to the largest eigenvalue λ * as the eigenvector centrality of R i in the risk network. Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the importance of a node in the risk network. It assigns relative centrality scores to all nodes in the network based on the principles: (1) connections to more nodes contribute more to the score of the node; (2) connections to high-scoring, namely important nodes, contribute more to the score of the node; (3) higher strength of the connection to other nodes contributes more to the score of the node.
In this sense, eigenvector centrality calculates not only direct connections but also indirect long-term propagations. Thus the complete risk network is taken into account. Mathematically, eigenvector centrality is closely related to the influence measures, such as those proposed in (Katz 1953 , Taylor 1969 , Friedkin 1991 , Hadi 1992 ). The idea is that even if a node influences directly only one other node, which subsequently influences many other nodes (who themselves influence still more others), then the first node in that chain is highly influential (Borgatti 2005) . For calculating the risk eigenvector centrality, besides the output links of a risk which contribute to its impact measure in the network, we also incorporate its input links for measuring its -14 -importance in terms of probability. That is why the matrix A+A T is based on for the proposed eigenstructure analysis with regard to project risk management.
Risk propagation model
In the project risk network, the nodes (risks) are assessed in terms of spontaneous probability and impact; the edges (risk interactions) are assessed as the transition probability from one risk to another. In the matrix-based risk propagation model, we assign the original risk probability evaluated by classical methods without considering interactions to each risk as its spontaneous probability. The assessed values in the RNM are used as transition probability between the related risks. Some assumptions are made in order to calculate risk propagation in the network:
(1) A risk may occur more than one time during the project (as witnessed in practical situations). Risk frequency is thus accumulative if arising from different causes or if arising several times from the same cause.
(2) The structure and values of RNM do not vary during the analysis time. In other words, there is no added or removed risk, and the transition probability between risks will not change during the analysis.
Hence, the RNM can be regarded as similar to the stochastic matrix or transition matrix used to describe the transition of a Markov chain (Buzacott and Shanthikumar 1993, Latouche et al. 1999) . This principle has been applied to industrial engineering, for example, Smith and Eppinger introduced a work transformation matrix based on the DSM method to model the engineering design iteration process (Smith and Eppinger 1997) . However, different from conventional stochastic matrix, in our model the RNM is a square matrix where all entries are nonnegative real numbers and inferior to 1, but -15 -the sum of each row or column is not necessarily equal to 1. A foundation work with respect to modelling risk interactions for propagation analysis has been presented by the authors in (Fang et al. 2010 ).
Suppose there are N identified risks in the network. We use vector s to represent the spontaneous probability of risks and A still denotes the RNM of transition probabilities. P(R) is the vector of risk probability or frequency after propagation analysis.
We define one step of risk propagation as that the occurrence of one risk R i may propagate to impact the risks that have direct cause-effect relationship with it (i.e., R j if
For the example of risk network in Figure 1 , R5 can propagate to trigger R1 directly within one step; it may also influence R1 in two steps of propagation through R6 or R4, and within three steps through the chain R5->R6->R4->R1, and so on. As vector s also represents the initial vector of risk probabilities, after m steps of propagation, the probability vector of risks propagated from the initial state is thus equal to m As  . If we only consider m steps of propagation and according to the assumption of accumulative risk frequency, the re-evaluated risk probability vector can be obtained by the following equation:
where I is the N-order identity matrix. In the limit of infinite propagation steps in the 
Some research papers established sufficient conditions for the convergence of infinite product of matrix, e.g., in (Thomason 1977 , Daubechies and Lagarias 1992 , Bru et al. 1994 , Holtz 2000 . In the project risk network, for example, if a risk is involved in several loops and the sum of the products of all the transition probabilities along these loops is greater than 1, the risk propagation process does not converge. This type of risk propagation is not likely to occur in practice and is outside the scope considered by our model.
Nevertheless, since A is the risk numerical matrix which is usually sparse and composed of transition probabilities at small values less than 1, usually the condition of Eq. (10) is satisfied. Thus, risk probability can be re-evaluated by the following equation:
Moreover, it is possible to predict the consequences of the occurrence of one or several initial risks using this model. We assign, for instance, 100% to the spontaneous probability of R i , while all the other risks have 0% initial values. That is to say, the -17 -initial vector s = I i , where I i is the i-th column of the identity matrix I. We can then anticipate the occurrence of the rest of the network, and thus evaluate the global consequences of R i .
Criticality is an important indicator used for prioritizing risks and usually defined as the product of risk probability and impact. Similar to risk probability, we can refine risk criticality by integrating all the potential consequences in the network of a given risk. Giving R i with its re-evaluated probability (risk frequency), we redefine its criticality by:
where C(R i ) is the criticality of R i ; G(R j ) is the original evaluated impact (G for gravity)
of R j ; and () i Rj PR denotes the probability of R j as the consequence of P(R i ). According to Eq. (11), the re-evaluated risk criticality is expressed by:
The vector of risk criticalities can be calculated by the following equation:
Here the symbol -.*‖ represents the array multiplication or the Hadamard product 
-18 -
The re-evaluation of risk characteristics such as probability and criticality enables us to update the risk prioritization results and then to design new risk response actions.
Application to a tramway infrastructure project
In this study, we implement the proposed approach to a real large project, aimed at  The establishment of a traffic signalling operating system, which gives priority to the tramway so as to guarantee travel time performance levels.
Building the project risk network
The first step is to build the project risk network. An original project risk list has been -19 -provided by the project manager and the expert team, which contains 42 project risks.
The risk list has been updated when performing the risk interaction identification. Some new risks have been added into the list, for two reasons: some were a consequence or cause of other risks already present in the initial list; others were seen as intermediary risks which were useful to explain the link between two or more risks of the initial list.
Thus, the resulting project risk list contains 56 identified risks at the main level, with their name, domain and risk owner information, as shown in Table 1 .
Identification of the risk interactions defines the structure of the project risk network. Using the DSM-based method described in Section 2.1, we get the RSM and the corresponding risk network structure (shown in Figure 2 ).
-20 - The direct assessment by experts is used on this case study for evaluating the strength of risk interactions. The assessment of the potential risk interactions was performed on a 10-level Likert scale (Likert 1932, Maurer and Pierce 1998) , thanks to the high expertise of interviewees. In particular, this step requires the participation of several experts involved in the project since it necessitates a very wide overview of the project elements and stakes. In the end, the RNM of the project was obtained. It is displayed in Figure 3 . Various gray scales are used to indicate the strength levels of the risk interactions. 
Classical project risk analysis
As we can see in the classical project risk list (Table 1) , basic characteristics of project risks have been assessed by the project manager and associated experts, including qualitative probability (or likelihood) and impact (or severity) scales, as well as criticality (aggregation of probability and impact). In classical project risk analysis, 23 risks are considered most important if having both high probability and impact. The results of this type of analysis are used by the project manager for risk response planning. Resources are firstly allocated to manage the risks prioritized with high criticality.
In Figure 4 , the classical project risk analysis results are displayed in a risk probability vs. impact diagram, where each risk identified in Table 1 is represented by a dot. The limits between different criticality levels should be defined a priori, before the risk assessment. For example, risks can be categorized into several levels of criticality, such as critical, high, moderate and low risks. In Figure 4 , we have highlighted the top- 
Results using the proposed methods
In In our risk propagation model, risk probability can be re-evaluated through Eq.
(11) into risk frequency. As we can see in Table 2 , the frequency of risks has increased to varying extent taking into account the interactions with other risks in the network.
Some risks have high risk frequency which is greater than one. As mentioned in the assumption of the model, this is consistent with the reality that one risk may occur more than once during the project. The examples are R2 (Liquidated damages on intermediate milestone and delay of progress payment threshold), R43 (Return profit decrease) and R55 (Available cash flow decrease). Shown in Figure 2 of the risk network structure, many other risks lead to these nodes which are closely related to financial performance.
Consequently, they have high frequency to occur during the project, and even more than one time (accumulation).
Risk criticalities can also be refined by the risk propagation model. As a result, the risk rankings have also changed. Seen from Table 3 and the column of ranking shift 27 in Table 3 . This is the opposite for R43 and R7, where R7 is still behind after re-revaluation, but closer.
The shift of priorities reflects the intensity of risk interactions in the network.
The eigenvector centrality provides a measurement of risks in terms of their position and importance in the network. As we can see in Table 3 (Operating certificate delay) and R18 (Civil Work delay & continuity) with many inputs as well as many outputs act as transition risks in the risk network. R44 (Extra trains) is in the top-ten list because it has direct contacts with some key nodes such as R2, R7 and R43, which enhance the measure of its influence in the network.
Discussion
This paper has presented a matrix-based method for modelling risk interactions and then re-evaluating risks in terms of various indicators. A realistic application to a tramway implementation project is performed with the involvement of the project manager and the team of experts.
The DSM method is used in the field of PRM for identifying risk interactions.
The parameters in the constructed project risk network are assessed so that we are able It is shown that the refined risk criticality analysis results are closely correlated with the eigenvector centrality-based risk prioritisation. The risks with high eigenvector centrality are also ranked as top risks in the refined risk criticality analysis. For example, in the case study presented, night risks (R2, R7, R10, R12, R16, R18, R37, R43, R55)
are the same in the top-ten risk list respectively based on these two measures. It is due to the fact that the risks with high eigenvector centrality act as -hubs‖ which play the role of key passages for risk propagation. This is helpful for the project manager in giving priority to certain risks and in designing more effective response actions. conducting actions on these key risks or interactions can then be efficient for mitigating the propagation phenomena and reducing the overall risk exposure.
As a next step, some other network centrality measures in literatures will be used to analyse and prioritise risks, and the results will be compared with the refined risk criticality analysis and eigenstructure analysis with respect to project risk management. The uncertainties of estimated inputs on risks and risk interactions will be modelled and their propagation in the risk network should be calculated, e.g., though a sensitivity analysis. The concept of robustness, e.g., the traditional static robustness and the dynamic robustness raised in Bar-Yam 2004a, Braha and Bar-Yam 2007) , will also be investigated in terms of the project risk network.
